Second FIR for the same offence?

In the matter of Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh decided on 26-11-2010 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “First Information Report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the First Information Report”. In the case of Babubhai v. State of Gujarat & Others on 26th August, 2010, in Criminal Appeal No.1599 of 2010 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2077 of 2010 this Court observed in para 13 as under: 13. ".......the investigating agency has to proceed only on the information about commission of a cognizable offence which is first entered in the Police Station diary by the Officer In-charge under Section 158 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter called the Cr.P.C.) and all other subsequent information would be covered by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. for the reason that it is the duty of the Investigating Officer not merely to investigate the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and the nvestigating Officer has to file one or more reports under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. Even after submission of the report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C., if the Investigating Officer comes across any further information pertaining to the same incident, he can make further investigation, ..........". In the matter of Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh it was further held that “In our opinion, it was not necessary to record another FIR as the death was result of septicemia which was due to the burn injuries. Looking to the facts of the present case, in our opinion, in fact the second FIR was nothing but a consequence of the event..... In the circumstances, the contents of the so called second FIR ...... could have been incorporated in the police diary as a result of further information or event which had been taken place in pursuance of the first offence.... It is true that the second FIR .... had been lodged .....when the report with regard to the death of the deceased was reported. As a mater of fact, in our opinion, it was not necessary to note the same as a new FIR but simply because the S.H.O made a mistake by recording it as a fresh FIR, it would not make the case of the prosecution weak especially when no prejudice had been caused to the appellant or any other person because of the aforestated further information with regard to the death being recorded as a new FIR”.

Whether a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction?

In Puran Chand v. State of Haryana, 2010 (6) SCC 566, it was held that: "15. The courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross- examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration......... 18. The law is now well settled that a dying declaration which has been found to be voluntary and truthful and which is free from any doubt can be the sole basis for convicting the accused. ......... " In the matter of Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh dated 26-11-2010 the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon the above said decision of this court and held that “ it cannot be said that on the sole basis of dying declaration the order of conviction could not have been passed”.

Independence of constitutional functionaries v. Right to Information

In the matter of Central Public Information Officer,Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal dated 26-11-10 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India made the following observation under the scope of the Right to Information Act: It is in the public interest to keep the appointment and transfer of Supreme Court and High Court Judges from "needless intrusions by strangers and busybodies in the functioning of the judiciary". In the matter of (1981) Supp SCC 87 and (1993) 4 SCC 441 this court held that "This is also in accord with the public interest of excluding these appointments and transfers from litigative debate, to avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions and to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all the constitutional functionaries, which is essential for effective consultation and for taking the right decision. The growing tendency of needless intrusion by strangers and busybodies in the functioning of the judiciary under the garb of public interest litigation..." It was further submitted that the appointment of Judges is essentially a discharge of constitutional trust as laid down by this Court in Subhash Sharms Vs. Union of India. The submission was that the information made available to the Chief Justice of India in respect of appointment of Judges of the High Court and as well as the Supreme Court is held by him in trust and in fiduciary capacity. In S.P.Gupta (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 574 it was further observed that on a holistic reading of the said judgment, it appears that the Court was mainly dealing with the question as to whether any immunity could be claimed from production of the records in respect of the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to the transfer of a High Court Judge including the Chief Justices of the High Court which were extremely material for deciding whether there was full and effective consultation? It is observed at more than one place that the non- disclosure of the said documents would seriously handicap the petitioner therein in showing that there was no full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India or that the transfer was by way of punishment and not in public interest. It is observed: “It would become almost impossible for the petitioner, without the aid of these documents, to establish his case, even if it be true." The Court felt that "all relevant documents should be produced before the court so that the full facts may come before the people, who in a democracy are the ultimate arbiters". The Court further observed : "We do not see any reason why, if the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notes made by them, in regard to discontinuance of an Additional Judge are relevant to the issues arising in a judicial proceeding, they should not be disclosed. ... Where it becomes relevant in a judicial proceeding, why should the Court and the opposite party and through them, the people not know what are the reasons for which a particular appointment is made or a particular Additional Judge is discontinued or a particular transfer is effected. We fail to see what harm can be caused by the disclosure of true facts when they become relevant in a judicial proceeding". The court further observed that Whether the said decision would be applicable when such information is sought under the provisions of the Right to Information Act is an important question that is required to be gone into. It stated that “we are of the considered opinion that a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is involved in the present case which is required to be heard by a Constitution Bench. The case on hand raises important questions of constitutional importance relating to the position of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India under the Constitution and the independence of the Judiciary in the scheme of the Constitution on the one hand and on the other,fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Right to information is an integral part of thefundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution. Right to Information Act merely recognizes the constitutional right of citizens to freedom of speech and expression. Independence of Judiciary forms part of basic structure of the Constitution of India. The independence of Judiciary and the fundamental right to free speech and expression are of a great value and both of them are required to be balanced. The Constitution is fundamentally a public text—the monumental character of a Government and the people-- and Supreme Court is required to apply it to resolve public controversies. For, from our beginnings, a most important consequence of the constitutionally created separation of powers has been the Indian habit, extraordinary to other democracies, of casting social, economic, philosophical and political questions in the form of public law remedies, in an attempt to secure ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court. In this way, important aspects of the most fundamental issues confronting our democracy finally arrive in the Supreme Court for judicial determination. Not infrequently, these are the issues upon which contemporary society is most deeply divided. They arouse deepest emotions. This is one such controversy. William J. Bennan, Jr. in one of his public discourse observed: "We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentieth-century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the vision of their time. This realization is not, I assure you, a novel one of my own creation. Permit me to quote from one of the opinions of our Court, Weems V. United States, 217 U.S. 349, written nearly a century ago: "Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophesy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be." The current debate is a sign of a healthy nation. This debate on the Constitution involves great and fundamental issues. Most of the times we reel under the pressure of precedents. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? Following substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arise for consideration:
1. Whether the concept of independence of judiciary requires and demands the prohibition of furnishing of the information sought? Whether the information sought for amounts to interference in the functioning of the judiciary?
2. Whether the information sought for cannot be furnished to avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions and to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all the constitutional functionaries, which is essential for effective consultation and for taking the right decision? 3.Whether the information sought for is exempt under Section 8(i)(j) of the Right to Information Act? “
the court held that “the above questions involve the interpretation of the Constitution raise great and fundamental issues”. For the aforesaid reasons, the court directed the Registry to place this matter before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength.

Related Person under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985

In the matter of Commissioner, Central Excise,Chandigarh v. M/s. Kwality Ice Cream Co. dated 26/11/2010 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India discussed in the detail about who can be called as related person under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985(for short `the Act'). It observed that under Section 4 of the Act provides as under: "SECTION 4. VALUATION OF EXCISABLE GOODS FOR PURPOSES OF CHARGING OF DUTY OF EXCISE. (1) Where under this Act, the duty of excise is chargeable on any excisable goods with reference to value, such value shall, subject to the other pro visions of this section, be deemed to be-(a) The normal price thereof, that is to say, the price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal, where the buyer is not a related person and the price is the sole consideration for the sale: Provided that - (i) Where, in accordance with the normal practice of the wholesale trade in such goods, such goods are sold by the assessee at different prices to different classes of buyers (not being related persons) each such price shall, subject to the existence of the other circumstances specified in clause (a), be deemed to be the normal price of such goods in relation to each such class of buyers; (ia) where the price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee is different for different places of removal, each such price shall, subject to the existence of other circumstances specified in clause (a), be deemed to be the normal price of such goods in relation to each such place of removal; (ii) Where such goods are sold by the assessee in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal at a price fixed under any law for the time being in force or at a price, being the maximum, fixed under any such law, then, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii) of this proviso, the price or the maximum price, as the case may be, so fixed, shall, in relation to the goods so sold, be deemed to be the normal price thereof; (iii) Where the assessee so arranges that the goods are generally not sold by him in the course of wholesale trade except to or through a related person, the normal price of the goods sold by the assessee to or through such related person shall be deemed to be the price at which they are ordinarily sold by the related person in the course of wholesale trade at the time of removal, to dealers (not being related persons) or where such goods are not sold to such dealers, to dealers (being related persons), who sell such goods in retail; (b) Where the normal price of such goods is not ascertainable for the reason, that such goods are not sold or for any other reason, the nearest ascertainable equivalent thereof determined in such manner as may be prescribed. (2)........... (3)........... (4) For the purposes of this section,- (a) "Assessee" means the person who is liable to pay the duty of excise under this Act and includes his agent;(b).............(c) "Related person" means a person who is so associated with the assessee that they have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other and includes a holding company, a subsidiary company, a relative and a distributor of the assessee, and any sub- distributor of such distributor. Explanation : In this clause "holding company", "subsidiary company" and "relative" have the same meanings as in the Companies Act, 1956." According to clause (c) of sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act, `related person' means a person who is so associated with the assessee that they have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other and includes a holding company, a subsidiary company etc. The explanation to Section 4 (4) (c) further provides that in this clause `holding company', `subsidiary company' and ` relative' have the same meanings as in the Companies Act, 1956. It is in this background that the validity or otherwise of the Tribunal's order is required to be analyzed and judged. In Union of India vs. Bombay Tyre International Ltd.1, this Court examined the scheme of Section 4 (1) (a) before the Amendment Act, 1973 and also the position after the amendment. It was contended in that case before this Court that the definition of the expression "related person" was arbitrary and it included within its ambit a distributor of the assessee. This Court, however, held that in the definition of `related person' being a relative and a distributor could be legitimately read down and its validity upheld. The definition of `related person' should be so read, this Court emphasised, that the words "a relative and a distributor of the assessee" should be understood to mean a distributor who was a relative of the assessee. The Explanation to Section 4(4)(c) provides that the expression "relative" has the same meaning as in the Companies Act, 1956. The definition of "related person", as being "a person who is so associated with the assessee that they have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other and includes a holding company, a subsidiary company ...", shows a sufficiently restricted basis for employing the legal fiction. It was reiterated that it is well settled that in a suitable case the Court could lift the corporate veil where the companies share the relationship of a holding company and a subsidiary company and also pay regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade. This aspect was further examined by this Court in Union of India Vs. ATIC Industries Ltd.This Court referred to the decision of Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (supra) and also referred to the first part of the definition `related person' in clause (c) of Section 4 [ 1984 (17) ELT 323 SC = 1984 (3) SCR 930]. (4) which defines `related person'. This Court observed that if the transactions between the manufacturer and his customers were on principal to principal basis and the whole sale price charged by the assessee to the customers was the sole consideration for the same and no extra commercial considerations entered in the determination ofsuch a price, the customer cannot be held to be a `related person' merely because he holds 50% share in the manufacturing company. It is held: "It is not enough that the assessee has an interest, direct or indirect, in the business of the person alleged to be a related person nor is it enough that the person alleged to be a related person has an interest, direct or indirect, in the business of the assessee. It is essential to attract the applicability of the first part of the definition that the assessee and the person alleged to be a related person must have interest, direct or indirect, in the business of each other. Each of them must have a direct or indirect interest in the business of the other. The equality and degree of interest which each has in the business of the other may be different; the interest of one in the business of the other may be direct, while the interest of the latter in the business of the former may be indirect. That would not make any difference, so long as each has got some interest, direct or indirect, in the business of the other" In Union of India vs. Playworld Electronics Pvt.Ltd., this Court took the view that merely because goods are produced with customer brand name and the entire production sold to the owner of the brand name, cannot be treated as a sale between `related persons'. The case was that Playworld Electronics Pvt.Ltd. manufactured its products in the brand name of `Bush' from the very beginning and was selling the same exclusively to M/s. Bush India Limited or its authorized dealers only. This Court took the view that the market value of the goods of Playworld Electronics Pvt. Ltd. was the price charged from M/s. Bush India Ltd. and not the market value at which price M/s. Bush India Ltd. sold to its wholesalers for the purpose of payment of excise duty. In Calcutta Chromotype Ltd. vs.Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta4 . The said decision refers the decision of this court in Atic Industries Ltd. (supra). The Court in the said decision also noticed the view expressed by this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Madras vs. T.I. Millers Ltd., Madras and T.I. Diamond Chain, Madras [ 1988 (35) E.L.T. 8 (SC)], Snow White Industrial Corporation vs. Collector of Central Excise [ 1989 (41) E.L.T. 360 (SC)]. After the analysis of all the said decisions this Court held: "If we examine the thrust of all the decisions, there is no bar on the authorities to lift the veil of a company, whether a manufacturer or a buyer, to see it was not wearing that mask of not being treated as related person when, in fact, both, the manufacturer and the buyer, are in fact the same persons. Under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, value of the excisable goods shall not be deemed to be normal price thereof, i.e., the price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal, if the buyer is a related person and price is not the sole consideration for sale. As to who is a related person, we have to see its definition in Section 4(4)(c) of the Act. It is not only that both the manufacturer and the buyer are associated with each other for which corporate veil may be lifted to see who is behind it but also that they should have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other. But once it is found that persons behind the manufacturer and the buyer are same, it is apparent that the buyer is associated with the manufacturer, i.e., the assessee and then regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business it can be presumed that they have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other (refer Section 114 of the Evidence Act). It is, however, difficult to lay down any broad principle to hold as to when the corporate veil should be lifted or if on doing that, it could be said that the assessee and the buyer are related persons. That will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it will have to be seen who is calling the shots in both the assessee and the buyer. When it is the same person the authorities can certainly fall back on the third proviso to clause (a) of Section 4(1) of the Act, to arrive at the value of the excisable goods. It cannot be that when the same person incorporates two companies of which one is the manufacturer of excisable goods and the other is the buyer of those goods, the two companies being separate legal entities, the Excise authorities are barred from probing anything further to find out who is the person behind these two companies. It is difficult to accept such a narrow interpretation. True that shareholdings in a company can change but that is the very purpose to lift the veil to find out if the two companies are associated with each other. Law is specific that when duty of excise is chargeable on the goods with reference to its value then the normal price on which the goods are sold shall be deemed to be the value provided (1) the buyer is not a related person and (2) the price is the sole consideration. It is a deeming provision and the two conditions have to be satisfied for the case to fall under clause (a) of Section 4(1) keeping in view as to who is the related person within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 4(4) of the Act. Again if the price is not the sole consideration, then again clause (a) of Section 4(1) will not be applicable to arrive at the value of the excisable goods for the purpose of levy of duty of excise." In Flash Laboratories Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi the appellant-Company was a manufacturer of toothpaste ("Prudent") falling under Sub-Heading 3306.00 of the Schedule to the Act. It had been selling its products to its holding Company, PP Ltd. as well as to PB Ltd. which was also a subsidiary Company of PP Ltd. The appellant had been paying duty at the price at which the goods were sold to the holding Company. Having regard to the fact that both appellant as well as PB Ltd. were subsidiary Companies of PP Ltd., this Court took the view that though the relationship between the appellant and PB Ltd. is indirect, they had mutual interest in the business of each other. The facts and circumstances of the case reveal that there is a mutuality of interest between the three Companies as 60% of the products of the appellants was sold to PP Ltd. And remaining 40% of the total products of toothpaste was being sold to PB Ltd. Moreover, it was found that PP Ltd. Was incurring expenses for sales promotion and advertisement for the sale of the appellants' products namely "Prudent Toothpaste". It was under those circumstances it was held that the parties to the transactions were `related persons'. In CCE vs.Xerographic Ltd., this Court reiterated the well settled principle and laid down the three conditions that are required to be satisfied before invoking the third proviso, namely, firstly, there should be mutuality of interest; secondly, that the alleged `related person' should be related to the assessee as per definition of Section 4 (4) (c) given in the Act and thirdly, and importantly, that the price charged from the `related persons' was not the normal price but the price lower than the normal price and because of extra-commercial considerations the price charged was less than the normal value. On analysis of the decisions referred to herein above, it appears what is important is that each of the parties involved should have an interest, whether direct or indirect in the business of each other.In Supreme Washers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune7, the Court had to consider and analyse the concept of mutual interest and it was found that there was common procurement of raw material, parties had common stock accounting and planning and interdependence in manufacturing operations. It was held that having common stock of raw material and semi finished goods, having common use of machinery between the three units, having common marketing arrangements and free flow of finance between the three units cumulatively indicates interdependence of the three units with each other as also inter-relationship, cumulatively establishes the appellants inter relationships and interdependence with each other.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and its difficulty

Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted to prevent corruption. But its misuse and preventive interpretation has created many difficulties. Courts has to look in every aspect whether the person has actually done an offece under the said Act or it is mere an act to trouble him. the very first question comes in my mind is if i have not asked money and the work has been done promptly by me(if there is no legal bar) how can i be booked for the same? the same attempt was made in the matter of C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. Th. I.P. decided on 25/11/2010 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. in this case the appellant(who was posted as Deputy Chief Engineer, Railway Electrification, South Central Railway, Vijaywada.) was arrested and sentenced for taking illegal money from one Venka Reddy (hereinafter referred to as the `contractor'). During the years 1992-1994contractor,was awarded the contracts of railway electrification between railway stations Bhongir and Sanathnagar and Maulali and Sanathnagar bypass under agreement No. 29 dated 3.4.1992 and agreement No. 41 dated 20.11.1992 respectively. Further by agreement No. 3 dated 18th October, 1994 work to provide height gauges at railway crossing between Vijayawada and Gannavaran was awarded to him. The contractor completed the works to the satisfaction of the railway authorities and in respect of the works covered by aforesaid agreement nos. 29 and 41 he received the payment. The contractor also completed the work covered under agreement No. 3 dated 18.10.1994 aforesaid in the month of March, 1995. The appellant was the competent authority to pass the bills and accordingly the contractor met him on 19.4.1995 and requested to finalise the bill. The appellant denied to issue and demanded Rs. 3,000/- as illegal gratification. The contractor expressed his inability to pay the illegal gratification but the appellant insisted and asked him to bring the money on 20th April, 1995.He then met the officials of the Central Bureau of Investigation and gave a written report. Being satisfied with the bonafide of the allegation, a pre-trap exercise was undertaken on the instruction of office Superintendent.The contractor alongwith the shadow-witness to the office of the appellant. The witness was asked to leave the chamber and he went out. Thereafter appellant demanded the money and the contractor handed over the tainted money to him, which he received from his right hand and kept in right side pocket of the trouser. A signal was given, whereupon the Inspector along with his team entered in the chamber, apprehended the appellant and conducted sodium carbonate test on the fingers of both the hands and right trouser pocket of the appellant, which turned pink. The tainted notes were lying on the floor of the office, which were recovered. After usual investigation, the Investigating Agency submitted the charge-sheet and the appellant was put on trial, where he abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. The appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure made a plea of false implication of him due to enmity with the contractor. The same was rejected by the trial court and accordingly the appellant was convicted and sentenced , which was further affirmed in appeal by the High Court. The same plea was also made by the accused before Supreme Court that he has been falsely implicated as there being strained relationship between the appellant and the contractor it is highly improbable that he would demand the illegal gratification from him.it was stated that In the case of Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 Supp. SCC 266 this court held that “26. Therefore, the very foundation of the prosecution case is shaken to a great extent. The question as to the handing over of any bribe and recovery of the same from the accused should be considered along with other material circumstances one of which is the question whether any demand was at all made by the appellant for the bribe. When it is found that no such demand was made by the accused and the prosecution has given a false story in that regard, the court will view the allegation of payment of the bribe to and recovery of the same from the accused with suspicion." Further in the case of Panalal Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharasthra, (1979) 4 SCC 526 and which attention has been drawn to paragraph 9 thereof which reads as follows: "9. It will be seen that the version of the complainant that the appellant asked the complainant whether he had brought the money and that the complainant told him that he had and that the appellant asked him to pay the money to the second accused is not spoken to by the panch witness PW 3. According to panch witness on the complainant asking the appellant whether his work will be achieved, the appellant assured him in the affirmative and the appellant told the complainant what was to be given to the second accused. It is significant that PW 3 does not mention about the appellant asking the complainant whether he had brought the money and on the complainant replying in the affirmative asking the complainant to pay the money to the second accused. Omission by PW 3 to refer to any mention of money by the appellant would show that there is no corroboration of testimony of the complainant regarding the demand for the money by the appellant. On this crucial aspect, therefore, it has to be found that the version of the complainant is not corroborated and, therefore, the evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be relied on." Another decision on which reliance is placed is the decision of this Court in the case of Meena (Smt) W/O Balwant Hemke v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21 in which it held as follows: "The corroboration essential in a case like this for what actually transpired at the time of the alleged occurrence and acceptance of bribe is very much wanting in this case. Even the other panch witness, PW 5 categorically admitted that even as the Inspector of Police, PW 6 arrived, the appellant gave the same version that PW 1 tried to force into her hands the currency note which she turned down by pushing it away, and his evidence also does not lend credibility to the case of the prosecution. The contradictory version of PW 1 of the very incident when earlier examined in departmental proceedings renders his testimony in this case untrustworthy. PW 3, the Head Copyist, seems to be the brain behind all this and that PW 1 as well as Jagdish Bokade appear to be working as a group in this affair and despite the blunt denial by PW 3, his closeness to PW 1 and Jagdish Bokade stands well substantiated. All these relevant aspects of the case seem to have been completely overlooked by the courts below."Reference was also made to a decision of this Court in the case of Dalpat Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1969 SC 17, in which it has been held as follows: "We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that PWs 1,2,3,4 and 17 and other prosecution witnesses to whose evidence we shall presently refer, should be considered as accomplices and therefore their evidence is required to be corroborated in material particulars before being accepted. On the proved facts, even those who gave illegal gratification to the appellants cannot be considered as accomplices as the same was extorted from them. Though PWs 1,2,4 and 17 can be considered as interested witnesses as regards their evidence relating to trap, as a matter of law, it is not correct to say that their evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration, see State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh 1959 SCR 195 = (AIR 1958 SC500) . In the present case after considering all the relevant submission made by the respected counsels of the parties the Court held that “We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr. Rai that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the offence under the Act. Further mere recovery of currency notes itself does not constitute the offence under the Act, unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. In the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that both the ingredients to bring the act within the mischief of Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act are satisfied. From the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution it is evident that the appellant demanded the money from the contractor as he had passed his bills. There is further evidence that when the contractor went along with the shadow-witness on the date told by the appellant for payment of the bribe, appellant asked the shadow-witness to leave the chamber and thereafter the demand for payment of illegal gratification was made and paid. The positive sodium carbonate test vis-`-vis the fingers and right trousers pocket of the appellant go to show that he voluntarily accepted the bribe. Thus there is evidence of demand of illegal gratification and the voluntary acceptance thereof.” According Court dismisses the appeal and upheld the order of trail court and the High Court.